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Abstract
The current research examines the role of social value orientation in determining the
extent to which individuals are inclined to reciprocate cooperation exhibited by others
perceived as either honest, intelligent, or unintelligent. Results revealed that individuals
with prosocial orientation reciprocated high levels of cooperation regardless of other’s
characteristics. Individuals with proself orientation (i.e. individualists and competi-
tors) exhibited some reciprocal cooperation toward others perceived as honest, yet
took advantage of others perceived as intelligent or unintelligent. These results suggest
that proselfs can be motivated to reciprocate cooperation by others if they have faith in
others’ benign intentions and trustworthiness. # 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
How do we respond to others who have been helpful to us? Do we reciprocate such
helpfulness, or might we be somewhat tempted to exploit such helpfulness, and not
exchange this favour in return? Tendencies toward reciprocal cooperation (or
reciprocal altruism) have been claimed to be a ubiquitous and functional approach to
interpersonal relationships (cf. Gouldner, 1960), particularly when these relationships
are challenged by social dilemmas (i.e. conflicts of self-interests and joint interest;
cf. Axelrod, 1984; Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1991). We propose that tendencies
toward reciprocal cooperation are at least partially aected by individual dierences
in social value orientation (i.e. preferences for particular distributions of outcomes for
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self and others). Congruent with this claim, extant research reveals that individuals
who are inclined to maximize joint outcomes and minimize dierences between own
and others’ outcomes (i.e. prosocials) respond cooperatively to others who con-
sistently exhibit cooperation; moreover, they develop benign impressions of such
others (i.e. see them as honest and sincere). Individuals who are inclined to maximize
their own outcomes either in absolute sense (i.e. individualists) or relative to other’s
outcomes (i.e. competitors) respond noncooperatively to others who consistently
exhibit cooperation; moreover, they develop less benign impressions of such others
(i.e. see them as somewhat honest and sincere, but otherwise as unintelligent and
ignorant; cf. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand,
Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986).
Does this evidence imply that proselfs (i.e. individualists and competitors) never
reciprocate cooperation and that prosocials always reciprocate cooperation? Recent
studies suggest the importance of personality impressions regarding the interdepen-
dent other (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Prosocials exhibit the same level of co-
operation as they expect from others, and such tendencies toward ‘expectation-based’
reciprocity do not strongly depend on perceived characteristics of others. Proselfs
expect cooperation from others perceived as honest as well as from others perceived as
unintelligent, and tend to reciprocate when cooperation is expected on the basis of
other’s honesty but fail to do so when cooperation is expected on the basis of other’s
lack of intelligence.
How can this finding be understood? First, because honesty is clearly a
more desirable attribute than unintelligence, it is possible that impressions of other’s
desirable attributes promote reciprocity. Second, honesty and unintelligence
represent two dierent dimensions. Honesty is strongly related to benign intentions
and trustworthiness (i.e. a dimension of social desirability), whereas unintelligence is
largely unrelated to benign intentions and trustworthiness (i.e. it is related to a
dimension of intellectual desirability; cf. Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). Thus, rather
than desirability per se, it may be that a desirable position on a socially desirable
dimension, which represents benign intentions and trustworthiness, promotes
reciprocity. Third, relative to honest partners, unintelligent partners elicit similar or
slightly lower levels of expected cooperation, but these expectations may be held with
dierent levels of confidence. Whereas one can count on what an honest other is going
to do, it is more dicult to predict what an unintelligent other is going to do. Such
unpredictability may enhance fear of exploitation, which in turn, should motivate
noncooperation.
The Present Research: Design and Hypotheses
The present research was designed to control for the unpredictability explanation by
using a social dilemma task in which participants were led to believe that the
interdependent other made a cooperative choice. The subsequent choice by the
participant, then, allows us to examine actual reciprocity, assessing the degree to which
prosocial and proself individuals reciprocate cooperation. This extends prior research
(e.g. Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), in that reciprocity is not based on expectations
based on levels of perceived honesty and unintelligence, but on actual observations of
the other’s cooperation. Accordingly, dierential levels of confidence regarding the
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probability of cooperative behaviour by honest versus unintelligent others could not
underlie the current findings.1
We manipulate personality impressions regarding the interdependent other,
thereby focusing on influences of impressions of other’s honesty and other’s unintel-
ligence, as these are the two personality impressions that proselfs associate with
cooperation (i.e. prosocials expect cooperation from honest others and unintelligent
others; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In addition, we examine others perceived as
intelligent because some people (prosocials, in particular) tend to associate intel-
ligence with cooperation, thus expecting high levels of cooperation from others
perceived as intelligent (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Moreover, these three others
(i.e. honest, intelligent, and unintelligent others) allow us to examine comparisons
between not only (a) honesty and unintelligence (i.e. desirable versus undesirable
on dierent dimensions), but also (b) between intelligence and unintelligence
(i.e. desirable versus undesirable on the same dimension), and (c) between honesty
and intelligence (i.e. desirable on dierent dimensions).2
Based on the findings of Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994), we advanced two major
hypotheses. First, we predicted that, across the honest, intelligent, and unintelligent
others, prosocials would exhibit greater reciprocity than proselfs. Second, we
predicted that prosocials would exhibit high levels of reciprocity with others perceived
as honest or unintelligent, whereas proselfs would exhibit substantially lower levels of
reciprocity when the other is perceived as unintelligent than when the other is
perceived as honest.3 In a more exploratory vein, we examine whether proselfs
might be inclined to exhibit relatively high levels of reciprocity with others perceived
as honest (a) because such others are characterized by a desirable attribute, or
(b) because honesty is inherently linked to benign intentions and trustworthiness.
According to the former explanation, proselfs should exhibit greater levels of
reciprocity toward honest and intelligent others than toward unintelligent others,
because both honesty and intelligence are desirable attributes. According to the latter
explanation, proselfs should exhibit greater levels of reciprocity toward honest others
than toward unintelligent and intelligent others, because honesty is more strongly
linked to benign intentions and trustworthiness than is intelligence (cf. Rosenberg
& Sedlak, 1972).
1Although levels of confidence in one’s expectations are irrelevant to the present research, one could argue
that actual cooperation by an unintelligent other would be more likely to be attributed to less intentionality
(i.e. an unintelligent other does not really know what s/he is doing) than actual cooperation by an honest or
intelligent other.
2We do not examine others perceived as dishonest, because neither prosocials nor proselfs associate
dishonesty with cooperation. Moreover, comparisons of dishonest others with each of the three others
would be somewhat dicult to interpret because a dishonest other who exhibits maximal cooperation is
more conflicting with a priori expectations of both prosocials and proselfs than maximal cooperation by
either of the other three others.
3Of lesser relevance, the two predictions also imply a main eect for perceptions of other’s honesty,
intelligence, versus unintelligence, in that across social value orientations, participants should exhibit
greater reciprocity toward honest others than toward unintelligent others, with intermediate levels of
reciprocity toward intelligent others.
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METHOD
Participants and Experimental Design
Twenty-five students (13 men, 12 women) participated in this study. The experimental
design is a 2 (social value orientation: prosocials versus proselfs) by 3 (perceptions of
other: honest versus intelligent versus unintelligent), with the latter factor being a
within-participant variable.
Procedure
The experiment was scheduled in groups of three to six persons. After they were
welcomed, each participant was seated in one of eight cubicles. The experiment began
with assessing participants’ social value orientations, using a series of nine ‘decom-
posed games’ (i.e. time 2 measurement), which were identical to the ones used in the
survey conducted 6 months prior to this experiment (i.e. time 1 measurement; for
more information regarding the measurement and validity of these nine decomposed
games, see Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). As in previous research,
participants were classified if they made at least six of the nine choices consistent
with one of the three social value orientations. Using these criteria, one participant
could not be classified at time 2. Of the 24 classifiable participants, we identified
10 participants who held prosocial orientations at both time 1 and time 2, and
11 participants who held individualistic or competitive orientations (i.e. proself
orientations) at both time 1 and time 2.4 These participants were included in the
analyses of reciprocity, thus excluding three participants whose social value orienta-
tions ‘moved’ from prosocial to proself or vice versa.
Next, participants engaged in a social dilemma, using a task which was adopted
from Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994). Each participant was asked to imagine that
(s)he had been given four yellow (blue) chips, and that the other had been given four
blue (yellow) chips. Each own chip had a value of 50 Dutch cents to the person
himself or herself, and a value of 100 Dutch cents to the other (i.e. 100 Dutch cents, or
a guilder, is about 60 cents in American currency). Similarly, each chip held by the
other had a value of 50 cents to the other, and a value of 100 cents to the participant
himself or herself. The participant’s task was to decide howmany of his/her four chips
to give to the other. Maximal cooperation is to give four chips (i.e. joint well-being is
better served by exchanging more chips), and maximal noncooperation is to give zero
chips (i.e. personal well-being is better served by giving fewer chips to the other).
This task was well-understood. All participants answered at least nine (out of 10)
comprehension questions correctly.
4More precisely, 10 prosocials, six individualists, and two competitors expressed the same social value
orientation at time 1 and time 2 (18 out of 24 participants who could be classified at time 2, yielding a
75 per cent consistency), indicating strong correspondence between time 1 and time 2 classification (chi2
[4, N 24] 16.84, p5 0.001; Gamma 0.74, p5 0.001). Although sample size is small, these findings
are congruent with the claim that social value orientations are robust over a substantial period of time,
thereby complementing prior research which has revealed test–retest consistency over a 4- to 6-week period
(e.g. Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986).
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We explained to participants that they would be paired to a number of others, and
that all of these others suciently understood the decision task and had made a choice
in the social dilemma task. Also, participants were led to believe that all of these other
individuals had completed the so-called Personality Characteristics Questionnaire
(PCQ), a highly reliable and valid personality questionnaire which provides measures
of a number of personality characteristics. Relevant to comparisons of high-honesty
and low-intelligence others, participants were paired to four others, who ostensibly
had decided to give away four chips. Regarding other’s honesty, one other was
described by having a score in the upper 20 per cent on ‘honesty’, and another by
having a score in the upper 20 per cent of ‘sincerity’ (i.e. the upper 20 per cent of the
scores that are possible on this questionnaire). Regarding other’s intelligence, one
other was described by having a score in the lower 20 per cent on ‘smartness’, and
another by having a score in the lower 20 per cent of ‘intelligence’. Because the
correlations between level of reciprocity for the two honest others, r(21) 0.59,
p5 0.001) as well as between that of the two unintelligent others, r(21) 0.77,
p5 0.001) were quite substantial, we calculated themeans across honesty and sincerity
and across low scores for intelligence and smartness. As noted earlier, we are also
interested in comparing (a) high-honesty with high-intelligence others, and (b) low-
intelligencewith high-intelligence others. Accordingly, participants were also paired to
another person who ostensibly had decided to give away four chips, and was described
by having a score in the upper 20 per cent on ‘smartness’.5
These five others were given a random position in a list of total 16 others so as to
minimize the possibility of reactivity (i.e. to distract them from comparing honest with
intelligent and/or unintelligent others) and to make them believe that individuals may
make choices other than giving away all four chips. The remaining 11 others
ostensibly made dierent choices (some of them gave away zero, two, or four chips)
and were described by high or low scores on several dimensions (e.g. adventurousness,
artistic ability, patience). Finally, individuals were debriefed, thanked for their
participation, and paid 12.50 Dutch guilders (which is about $6.00 in American
currency).
RESULTS
Reciprocal cooperation was analysed in a 2 (social value orientation: prosocials
versus proselfs) by 3 (impression: honest versus intelligent versus unintelligent)
ANOVA, the latter variable being a within-participant factor. As predicted,
prosocials (M 3.80) exhibited greater reciprocity than did proselfs (M 1.91), as
evidenced by a main eect for social value orientation, F(1,19) 27.95, p5 0.001.
A main eect for impression, F(2,18) 10.14, p5 0.001, revealed that another
described as honest (M 3.29) elicited greater levels of reciprocity than did another
described as unintelligent (M 2.38), with intermediate levels of reciprocity for
another described as intelligent (M 2.76).
5Impressions of other’s intelligence were measured with only one description (i.e. ‘smartness’) because our
primary focus was on comparisons of honest versus unintelligent others, both of which were measured with
two descriptions.
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As can be seen in Figure 1, an interaction of social value orientation and
impression, F(2,18) 6.45, p5 0.01, revealed that proselfs exhibited greater
reciprocity toward another described as honest (M 2.73) than toward another
described as intelligent (M 1.73) or another described as unintelligent (M 1.27).
In contrast, prosocials exhibited high levels of cooperation with another described as
honest (M 3.90), with another described as intelligent (M 3.90), as well as with
another described as unintelligent (M 3.60). Indeed, specific contrasts revealed
that the eect for impression was significant for proselfs, F(1,19) 15.34, p5 0.001,
but failed to be significant for prosocials, F(1,19) 0.59, n.s. (also, none of the
pairwise comparisons among prosocials were significant). Subsequent pairwise
comparisons among proselfs revealed that levels of reciprocity were significantly
greater for (a) honest versus unintelligent others, F(1,10) 9.41, p5 0.05, and for (b)
honest versus intelligent others, F(1,10) 7.10, p5 0.05. However, the contrast of
intelligent versus unintelligent others was not significant for proselfs, F(1,10) 0.43,
n.s. These analyses indicate that it is impressions of other’s honesty, rather than
other’s intelligence (or other’s unintelligence) that promote reciprocity among
proselfs.
The interaction of social value orientation and impression was further explored by
three 2 (social value orientation) by 2 (impression) analyses of variance, focusing
thereby on the contrasts of (a) honest versus unintelligent others (b) honest versus
intelligent others, and (c) intelligent versus unintelligent others. These analyses
revealed significant interactions of social value orientation with the contrasts of both
(a) honest versus unintelligent others, F(1,19) 4.60, p5 0.05 and (b) honest versus
intelligent others, F(1,19) 5.69, p5 0.05. The interaction of social value orientation
and the contrast of intelligent versus unintelligent others was absent, F(1,19) 0.04,
Figure 1. Reciprocal cooperation among prosocials and proselfs with others perceived as
honest, intelligent, or unintelligent
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n.s. These findings indicate that dierences between prosocials and proselfs in their
levels of reciprocity are significantly greater when the other is perceived as either
intelligent or unintelligent than when the other is perceived as honest.
DISCUSSION
Several studies have revealed that tendencies toward reciprocity shape cooperative
behaviour in social dilemmas (e.g. Komorita et al., 1991), and that prosocials are
more strongly inclined to reciprocate cooperation than are individualists and
competitors (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). The
present findings complement this literature by indicating that social value orientation
in combination with impressions of other’s honesty, intelligence, and unintelligence are
important to understanding reciprocity in social dilemmas. Prosocials reciprocate
cooperation with others perceived as honest, intelligent, or unintelligent, suggesting
that their reciprocity does not strongly depend on the impressions of the other. In
contrast, proselfs tend to reciprocate cooperation when the other is perceived as
honest, and substantially less so when the other is perceived as intelligent or unintel-
ligent. Accordingly, it is not simple desirability that promotes reciprocity among
proselfs. Rather, proselfs’ willingness to reciprocate is primarily promoted by impres-
sions of honesty and sincerity, which are strongly linked to faith in other’s benign
intentions and trustworthiness (cf. Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972).
The present findings are important for at least two reasons. First, prior research has
revealed that, when participants receive no information about other’s personality
characteristics, proselfs do not resist the temptation to exploit others who exhibit
unconditional forms of cooperation (e.g. Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). The current
findings complement and extend this work by indicating that proselfs would be more
likely to resist such temptation, if they had sucient faith in other’s benign intentions
and trustworthiness. While proselfs to some extent develop such benign impressions
of cooperative others, they also believe that such others are quite unintelligent and
weak (e.g. Liebrand et al., 1986). In light of the present findings, it is plausible that the
formation of these latter impressions carry greater weight than the former, more
benevolent impressions, in the tendency of proselfs to take advantage of cooperative
others.
Second, the extant literature of impressions has focused primarily on the formation,
organization, and maintenance of personality impressions, with relatively little
attention for the social-interactional consequences of such impressions in settings of
interdependence. This literature has revealed that individuals tend to organize their
impressions along dimensions of social desirability (i.e. socially good or bad) and
intellectual desirability (i.e. intellectually good or bad; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972),
which are similar to the dimensions of ‘other-profitability’ and ‘self-profitability’
(Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). The present findings indicate that it is impressions of
social desirability (or other-profitability) rather than intellectual desirability (or self-
profitability) that promote reciprocity among proselfs. Such findings help integrate
two distinct lines of research (i.e. impression formation and reciprocal cooperation)
and support the validity of extant models of interpersonal impressions in an actual
interaction context.
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